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ABSTRACT 
 
Reverse Auction Bidding: A Review of the First Case Study. 
 (May 2010) 
Dhaval Chandresh Guhya, B.E., University of Mumbai 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. John M Nichols 
                                                              Dr. Leslie Feigenbaum 
 
 It was in 2004 that the first case study was done by on the ongoing Reverse 
Auction Bidding at Texas A&M University. This long-term study has developed from a 
single case study, completed by van Vleet, to a series of case studies, now combined 
with personality testing of all participants. van Vleet developed a Microsoft Access 
database system and Active Server Pages web based user interface for the study. The 
first case study involved five participants with no prior experience in Reverse Auction 
Bidding. A study with five participants is considered competitive in accordance with the 
standard economic Herfindahl Index. van Vleet, concluded that the results showed a 
level of co-operation in the bidding game between the nominal competitors. In 2010 
John Nichols coined the term „tacit collusion‟ to identify this apparent behavioural 
pattern observed in the bidding. A significant element of the studies from 2005 to 2009 
has been to investigate the „tacit collusion‟ behaviour. Tacit collusion is not considered 
an illegal economic behaviour. In 2006 Seth Gregory encountered significant problems 
with a study involving ten participants using the Access database, as a result of Access‟ 
limitations on the number of connections.  
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Gregory‟s study was migrated to a Microsoft SQL database that was developed 
by Wellington (2006) and which overcame the limitations. SQL database systems can 
generate a significant quantity of data which create a computer science problem, now 
commonly termed „Data rich – analysis poor‟. This study is the first in a series of studies 
to undertake a detailed statistical study of the early case studies to provide a set of 
algorithms for development of SQL queries for automated real-time data analysis of 
future Reverse Auction Bidding case studies.  
This study showed that a fifth order polynomial fit the contract time compared to 
the job number. Analysis of the number of bids per minute for the fifteen minutes of bid 
time showed a log–polynomial equation which provided a reasonable fit to the data.  
Two sub-games were postulated to describe the operational aspects of the 
auction. The first game, termed the α game, is between the players with the objective of 
maximizing average return and the second game, termed the ω game, has the objective 
of average cost minimization for the purchasers and maximization of revenue for the 
seller group.  
In conclusion, Reverse Auction Bidding systems are not bid shopping, but the 
tenet that the purchaser will reduce costs in this type of system compared to the 
traditional closed bid system is not confirmed with van Vleet‟s data and any careful 
consideration of the results of canny players in the  game suggests higher than average 
returns for some bidders. The results show a number of patterns in the data that warrant 
further study, particularly the characteristics of the canny players. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
The OED (Little, Fowler, Coulson, Onions, & Friedrichsen, 1973) defines a bid 
as “the offer of a price”. The traditional form of obtaining a bid is to request a price from 
one or more entities, such as a builder, contractor or company, with the bid due at a 
specific time and place. This system of bidding is considered by most to be free of 
collusive influences. Alternative forms of bidding have been developed over the 
centuries; some suffer from the need for a subjective judgment about the ability of the 
bidder to perform the work, although prequalification may overcome this problem.  
One alternative purchase method is shopping, defined by the OED as “The action 
of visiting a shop or shops for the purpose of inspecting or buying goods.” The 
difference between bidding and shopping is the visibility of the object, in shopping 
inspection is possible. Whilst in construction bidding, the item sought is usually unique 
and merely shown on a set of drawings. Shops traditionally display a price and operate 
in a free market, where market is defined by the OED as “The meeting together of people 
for the purchase and sale of provisions or livestock, publically exposed, at a fixed time 
and place; the time of this; also the assembled company,” with minimal outside 
intervention and providing transparency to the hagglers. 
____________ 
This thesis follows the style of Adult Education Quarterly. 
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To haggle is defined by the OED, for the purposes of this study, is „to cavil, 
wrangle, dispute as to terms:, esp., to make difficulties in setting a bargain’. Haggling is 
not illegal and it is common in some shopping situations or systems, Whereas collusion, 
defined by the OED as „secret agreement or understanding for the purpose of trickery or 
fraud‟, is generally considered to be reprehensible and is usually illegal in a free market 
system, because of the economic distortions introduced into the market.  
Bid shopping is the practice of taking an offer prepared by a competent bidder 
and asking another distinct entity to match or beat the price. In a free market, each 
bidder is aware of the average expenditure required to gain a sale; as an example, in 
consulting engineering the amount of eight percent of the fee is generally considered 
reasonable for recovering the costs of preparing bids (Nichols, 2009) . In bid shopping, 
the second entity does not have to cover the cost of preparing multiple bids to obtain 
work, which is perceived as economically unfair and outs to distort the market. 
Reverse Auction Bid Systems were developed for the internet to facilitate 
purchase of goods, where the concept of the „traditional market‟ has broken down, often 
when the purchaser and seller cannot meet in the same place or it is difficult to meet in a 
common place. Reverse Auction Bidding systems are considered by some contractors as 
being an alternative form of bid shopping. Nichols (2009) considers Reverse Auction 
Bidding Systems, when operated by an independent entity of the purchaser, represents 
an electronic equivalent of a free market. 
A Reverse Auction Bidding System can be viewed as multiplayer game, with two 
sub-games. The first sub-game, designated   game, is between the bidders and the 
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second is the game between the bidding group and the purchaser, designated the   
game. The   game is a multi-player game; however the   game reduces in reality to a 
two-player game, with only one effective player able to make moves. The reduction of 
the   game to an equivalent two player game can be viewed as maximizing the return to 
the bidding group, designated   player, at the expense of the purchaser, designated   
player. Several case studies have been completed for a simple Reverse Auction Bidding 
scenario developed by van Vleet (2004).  
The purpose of this research work is to review the data collected by van Vleet, in 
the first case study, to establish analysis techniques and algorithms that can be 
incorporated into the SQL database as queries for future studies. 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
A five person case study was completed in 2004 (van Vleet, 2004) using a 
Reverse Auction Bidding System that had recently been developed by Kim (2004). van 
Vleet (2004) analysed the data obtained from the first case study but lacked the 
information available after the completion of seven case studies in the period 2005 to 
2009 to determine the critical elements from the data for this first case study in 2004.  
The research objectives for this study are:  
1. Establish plots of the bidding data  
2. Compare the bidding patterns shown in the plots with time for all bidders 
3. Determine if evidence exists in the bidding data to confirm the existence of the 
  game and does it represent some form of collusion 
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4. Compare the returns of the different bidders in the   game to determine if there 
are differences in bidding returns and does it represent some form of collusion. 
LIMITATIONS 
The limitations of the study are: 
1. the data obtained in van Vleet‟s initial case study and Chouhan‟s recent case 
study (Chouhan, 2009) will be used in the analysis, with Chouhan‟s data used 
for comparison purposes only  
2. all bidders were students or academic faculty in the Department of Construction 
Science. In van Vleet‟s study none of the participants had prior experience with 
Reverse Auction Bidding and in Chouhan‟s study at least one of the participants 
had experience with an earlier case study 
3. the prior experience of one bidder in the Chouhan‟s study, limits a direct 
comparison of the results 
4. steady state economic conditions are assumed for the case study period. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
van Vleet noted in 2004 that “In order to accurately assess the implications of 
reverse auctions, it was essential to know and understand the behaviours of those who 
engage in the bidding process. Without a method of evaluating the process, it is 
impossible to clearly understand whether RAB is a success or not. Therefore, by 
creating a simulation or model of an RAB, this research was able to collect and analyze 
substantial data which will contribute to the further understanding of the implications 
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that RAB will have on the construction industry” This study reviews the data from van 
Vleet‟s study to provide guidance in the development of tools to analyze subsequent case 
studies using the SQL database developed for Gregory‟s study in 2006.   
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Reverse Auction Bidding has been studied in the Construction Science 
Department since 2004. This study looks at the original game or case study completed 
by van Vleet (2004), to determine methods for automating the SQL database analysis of 
results from subsequent and future case studies. This literature review outlines the 
definitions for the game, the game type and a brief review of Reverse Auction Bidding. 
Chouhan (2009) provides a more detailed review of the  Reverse Auction Bidding 
system. 
DEFINITIONS 
This research is a continuation of previous Reverse Auction Bidding studies. 
Previous definitions established by van Vleet (2004), Gregory (2006), Chouhan (2009), 
Chaudary,(2009) and Panchal (2007) are included in this list.  
The necessary definitions are: 
   player  This represents the bidder group, treated as a single entity 
for the purpose of game analysis. 
i  player  The i
th
 bidder in the bidding group. 
  player  This represents the purchaser. 
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  game  The postulated sub-game played between bidders in 
seeking economic advantage over the remaining bidders. 
This game almost always disadvantages the   player, but 
the   player created the system and so is responsible for 
the   player‟s economic losses as a result. 
  game  The postulated sub-game played within the Reverse 
Auction Bidding game between the purchaser and the 
bidders. In terms of this analysis, it is deemed to 
effectively reduce to a two-player game, with competition 
implications for all players. The   player in reality sees 
only the average of all won bids.  
    Bid time allowed for each round of play in the game. 
   Period between bid time   that represents the work time 
in the game. 
jB    i
th
 bid 
vB    Accepted bid for each job. 
   This variable is a fixed dollar sum, representing the    
player‟s base price, although in this game K is a vector of 
costs.  
  This variable is a fixed dollar sum, representing the    
player‟s maximum incremental price above   
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   This variable is normally defined by the set of numbers 
{ | 0 1}   , although negative values of  are permitted 
by the Reverse Auction Bidding system.   is used to 
normalize the profit data. A negative 
j  represents a loss 
on direct costs to the i player who makes this type of bid, 
and enough of these bids will lead to a bankrupt player. 
This type of play is discouraged as the assumption in the 
game is steady state economic conditions in the outside 
economy. Future studies may look at a failing market, but 
that is beyond this study.  
Aggressive Bidder:  Willing to accept calculated risk of greater than average 
loss in pursuit of greater than average returns, first defined 
by Chouhan (2009).  
Bid:  A single entry into the game that represents a legally 
acceptable offer to complete the work assuming the bidder 
has been prequalified.  
Bidder:   An entity that submits a bid. In this game, there are usually 
three to ten bidders, and each is an individual, rather than a 
company. In van Vleet‟s (2004) study, none of the bidders 
had prior experience, which is not true for Chouhan‟s 
(Chouhan, 2009) study.  
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Bid Efficiency: The ratio of the total number of jobs won to the total 
number of bids. This is one of the postulated metrics for 
determining success in the   game.  
Case Study:   “Designed to study intensely one set (or unit) of 
something; for e.g. programs, cities, counties, worksites-as 
a distinct whole, with the goal of understanding the set as 
a distinct whole in its particular context. A case study 
reveals the process and outcome at certain sites and the 
way in which these interrelate. Case studies are conducted 
primarily using qualitative techniques, but do not exclude 
quantitative data.” (van Vleet, 2004)  
Collusion:   “A secret agreement between two or more parties for a 
fraudulent, illegal or deceitful purpose” (van Vleet, 2004). 
Or as defined by the OED as “secret agreement or 
understanding for the purpose of trickery or fraud”, is 
generally considered to be reprehensible and is usually 
illegal in a free market system, because of the economic 
distortions introduced into the market.  
Dutch Auction: “A type of auction where the auctioneer begins with a high 
asking price which is lowered until some participant is 
willing to accept the auctioneer's price, or a 
10 
 
predetermined reserve price (the seller's minimum 
acceptable price) is reached” (van Vleet, 2004).  
Economic Winner:  “An individual who generated the highest average 
returns.” Panchal (2007) coined this term to indicate a 
more successful player in the   game. An economic 
winner makes no direct difference to the   game for the 
   player where the    player has an objective of 
minimizing the average bid for the game. The   player 
sees the average price for purchases and a distribution of 
prices.  
Economic Loser:  “An individual who generated the lowest average 
returns.” Panchal (2007) coined this term to indicate a less 
successful player in the   game. An economic loser 
makes no direct difference to the   game for the    
player where the    player has an objective of minimizing 
the average bid for the game.  
Efficiency:   The ratio of the output to the input of any system. 
Game:  a series of jobs for the construction of a reinforced 
concrete floor slab, each game lasts approximately 8 to 10 
weeks in game play time, with each round of the game 
modelling a week and occurring in a 20 minute period, 
with 15 minutes of bid time and 5 minutes of build time.  
11 
 
Game Theory:   A formal analysis of conflict and cooperation among 
intelligent and rational decision makers.  
Herfindahl Index:   “a measure of the size of firms in relationship to the 
industry and an indicator of the amount of competition 
among them. It is defined as the sum of the squares of the 
market shares of each individual firm. As such, it can 
range from 0 to 10,000, moving from a very large amount 
of very small firms to a single monopolistic producer. 
Decreases in the Herfindahl index generally indicate a 
loss of pricing power and an increase in competition, 
whereas increases imply the opposite. The Department of 
Justice considers Herfindahl indices between 1000 and 
1800 to be moderately concentrated and indices above 
1800 to be concentrated. As the market concentration 
increases, competition and efficiency decrease and the 
chances of collusion and monopoly increase.” (van Vleet, 
2004).  
Job:  A work unit, in this case a reinforced concrete slab for a 
home builder, taking 5 working days to construct.  
Loan Amount:   It is a bank loan or a guarantee taken by the bidder with 
the purpose of increasing the bidders‟ job capacity. The 
cost is $500 per job.  
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Loss:  negative return applied to a business undertaking after all 
operating expenses have been met.  
Lump Sum Offer: A tender submitted for a lump sum amount in the game 
assumed to be for a fixed price.  
Pre-Qualified:  The process of declaring competent or capable or to certify 
in advance. The purpose of pre – qualified is to maintain 
the economic competition.  
Profit:  The return received on a business undertaking after all 
operating expenses have been met.  
Profit Efficiency:  It is the ratio of the profit made to the number of jobs won. 
This is one of the postulated metrics for determining 
success in the   game.  
Purchaser:   Either an owner or owner‟s representative who organizes 
the bid or tender document.  
Reverse Auction Bidding: “It is a single or multiple-item, open, descending-price 
auction. The initiator specifies the opening bid price and 
bid decrement. Each bidder submits a successively lower 
bid. At the end of the auction, the bidder with lowest bid 
value is being considered as a winner” (van Vleet, 2004).  
Second Bidder Issue: “It has been postulated that the lowest bidder in Reverse 
Auction Bidding is seeking to undercut the second bidder 
by the smallest quantifiable fragment, if the bidder 
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understands the principles of tacit collusion”(Chaudary, 
2009). The hypothesis forms the basis for future research.  
Sealed Bidding:  “In this type of auction, all bidders simultaneously submit 
bids in such a way that no bidder knows the bid of any 
other participant. The highest/lowest bidder is awarded 
the contract at an agreed price, all other things being 
equal” (van Vleet, 2004).  
Sherman Antitrust Act: “The act, based on the constitutional power of Congress 
to regulate interstate commerce, declared illegal every 
contract, combination (in the form of trust or otherwise), 
or conspiracy in restraint of interstate and foreign trade. 
According to Nichols (2010), the problem is tacit collusion 
does not fit within the meanings of the act, thus leading to 
the debate about the legality of RAB between contractors 
who consider it illegal or unethical and economists who 
accept the converse.”  
Tacit Collusion: “Seemingly independent, but parallel actions among 
competing firms (mostly oligopolistic firms) in an industry 
that achieve higher prices and profits, much as if guided 
by an explicit collusion agreement. Also termed implicit 
collusion, the distinguishing feature of tacit collusion is 
the lack of any explicit agreement. The key is that each 
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firm seems to be acting independently, perhaps each 
responding to the same market conditions, but the end 
result is the same as an explicit agreement. This should be 
contrasted with explicit or overt collusion that does 
involve a formal, explicit agreement. Tacit collusion is 
observed in Reverse Auction Bidding, and is potentially 
related to the Second Bidder Issue” (Chouhan, 2009). 
Nichols (2010) postulates that the α game has been 
observed and misunderstood as tacit collusion, in reality it 
can be viewed potentially reviewed as an aggressive player 
seeking a better than average return from the profit 
distribution resulting from the α game.  
Traditional Bidding:  “In this type of auction all bidders simultaneously submit 
bids in such a way that no bidder knows the bid of any 
other participant. The highest/lowest bidder is assumed to 
be awarded at the price submitted provided no other 
contracts opened on the decision process” (Chaudary, 
2009). 
Winners Curse: “Problem faced by uninformed bidders or poor game 
players. For example, in an initial public offering 
uninformed participants are likely to purchase larger 
15 
 
allotments of issues that informed participants know are 
overpriced.”  
GAME TYPE 
Consider a Reverse Auction Bidding game where the   player is willing to 
accept bids of the type shown in equation (1): 
                                               
j j    ,       (1) 
  represents the upper limit the   player is prepared to pay in the game above 
the nominal minimum bid amount  . A negative j  represents a loss on direct costs to 
the i player who makes this type of bid, and enough of these bids will lead to a 
bankrupt player. The concept of  can be attributed to Feigenbaum (Nichols, 2010), who 
considered there had to be an upper limit everyone was prepared to pay for a service or 
good.  
The bidding period for each game lasts for a set time,  , in this case it is 15 
minutes. The total cost for    player is shown in equation (2): 
                                       1
n
v j
j
   ,       (2) 
This total cost is based on the accepted lowest bid for each job, where the   
player submitted a valid bid. Each i  player then has a unique set of bids and a unique 
set of jobs, with a total return to the i  player defined by a simple summation. 
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REVERSE AUCTION BIDDING  
Reverse Auction Bidding (RAB) is a purchasing process for a good or services.  
RAB was first used in the manufacturing sectors, but this method is now used in the 
construction industry. Figure 1 shows a typical process for a Reverse Auction System. 
The process continues until a preset trigger occurs, in some situations it is passage of a 
time period since the last bid, or in the case of this research the bidding period is set at 
15 minutes for practical experimental reasons.  
 
 
Figure 1 Reverse Auction Bidding General Algorithm 
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REVERSE AUCTION BIDDING - THE RESEARCH GAME 
van Vleet (2004) developed a simple construction scenario for the Reverse 
Auction Bidding game. van Vleet‟s unpublished professional paper is not generally 
available, so the game development stage of van Vleet‟s research work  is outlined in 
this section. The construction work was assumed to occur in and around Houston at six 
locations as shown in Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2 Construction Site Locations in Houston (after MapQuest, 2006) 
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Table 1 lists the six locations shown on Figure 2 above. The distance in 
kilometres from the purchaser‟s office in Sugar Land is given in the table. The 
assumption for each of the i  players is that each player is one of several sub-contractors 
that this homebuilder, the   player, utilizes to construct the foundations for simple 
residential single-family homes. The work is repetitive, unchanged in terms of scope 
from week to week, other than the number of houses started per week. The game ignores 
the obvious problem that the   player should establish a long-term stable price. The use 
of a simple slab is merely a guide project; the assumption is that some work type would 
follow this market pattern. This issue of a long-term stock price is obviously not 
acceptable to a RAB based purchaser,   player, who is seeking a competitive advantage. 
In seeking the competitive advantage, the   player creates α game. The α game has a Ξ 
distribution that represents a potential net return to each i  player; who are seeking a 
competitive advantage within the Reverse Auction Bidding system. The key point is   
player creating the α game. The α game provides a mechanism for the canny i  player to 
seek to maximize their returns, whilst co-operative play is in the interest of λ players in 
the   game. Reverse Auction Bidding is a good game, but a less than satisfactory 
purchasing system for most goods and services. 
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Table 1  
Location of the Construction Sites in Houston 
Site # Location of Development Distance from Sugarland (kilometres) 
1 Brookside Village 41.6 
2 Piney Point Village 24 
3 Highlands 70.4 
4 Jersey Village 40 
5 Bunker Hill Village 27.2 
6 Richmond 14.4 
 
The work is repetitive, as is usual for a production homebuilder, which simplifies 
the production process. The production builder builds only one type of home and hence 
requires each contractor to pour only one type of slab. All i  players have been 
prequalified and only price matters, as is normal in this type of bidding system. The key 
assumption is that each Monday, the   player, posts the jobs that they are going to start 
that week. The data included is where each job is located.  
All information is given to the bidders through an ASP based web site (Kingsley-
Hughes, Kingsley-Hughes, & Read, 2004). The web site was developed by Kim (2004) 
for van Vleet, and has been maintained by Nichols (2010). This study uses the Microsoft 
Access database generated by van Vleet. 
Gregory (2006) encountered significant problems with a study involving ten 
participants using the Access database, as a result of Access‟ limitations on number of 
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connections. Gregory‟s study was undertaken on a Microsoft SQL database developed 
by Wellington (2006), which overcame the limitations. SQL database systems can 
generate a significant quantity of data, which creates a computer science problem, now 
commonly termed „Data rich – analysis poor‟. The current research problem for future 
studies is development of SQL queries to analyze the data. A domain location was 
created on a Texas A&M University server to host the Reverse Auction Bidding system. 
Six unique participant names were created for the study: Driver, Pliers, Concrete, Rove, 
Copper, and Log. The user names and associated passwords were located on in 
Microsoft Access data table, which could be accessed through the login screen. The use 
of the unique participant names is to protect the identity of the bidders in accordance 
with the IRB requirements for this type of study. These specific login name and 
password allowed the players to enter the website. However, it limited player access to 
the information that was relevant only to their bidding process.  
Figure 3 shows the login screen for van Vleet‟s study.  
 
Figure 3 Reverse Auction Bidding Login Screen 
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Figure 4 shows a sample data screen for one of the bidders. The screen shows the 
data for the fourth week. The screen shows one completed job, four jobs in progress and 
two current bids. 
  
 
Figure 4 Reverse Auction Bidding - Sample Data Screen 
This i  player‟s financial information is provided under the category defined as 
My Summary. The information provided was current calculated cash assets, capacity for 
additional works including jobs with bank guarantees and cumulative loan charges up to 
date. This summary of the current financial condition summarizes the working capital 
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information available to the participants. It is calculated by deducting costs of current 
jobs and bank loans from the profits of completed jobs. van Vleet did not want the 
bidders to have to spend time determining their costs or the potential profits each was 
making with a particular bid, so this website provides significantly more information 
than would be normal. This is not an issue as the   player is mythical, and thus cannot 
observe the games progress. The cost data provided for each site as shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Site Development Costs for Each Slab 
Site # Travel Cost ($) Delivery Cost ($) Total Cost($) 
1 858 624 1482 
2 495 360 855 
3 1452 1056 2508 
4 825 600 1425 
5 561 408 969 
6 297 216 513 
 
 
The base cost for the slab is $10,000. Table 3 lists the default variables for the 
Reverse Auction Bidding web site.  
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Table 3  
van Vleet's Default Variables for Game 
Component Unit Amount 
Bank account of each 
contractor at start of the 
game 
$ 40,000 
Job cost $ 
10,000 for the slab 
cost, travel costs 
delivery charges 
Total time of competition Weeks 8 
Maximum work capacity at 
outset of the game 
Jobs 3 
Loan amount for adding 
bid capacity 
$ 500 
Each job contract time Days 5 
Work week Days 
6 (Monday to 
Saturday) 
Chances of rain delay Percent 30 
Construction cost accrued - Daily 
Payment for work Day 5
th
  
Bidding time Minutes 15 
 
The basic scenario developed by van Vleet was discussed with Nichols (2010), 
who pointed out the need to maintain a simple system. Significant advances have 
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occurred with the web site; however, van Vleet established all of the critical factors for 
the game. The timing of each round of the game, representing a week, was set at 20 
minutes, with 15 minutes of bid time and 5 minutes of construction time. One 
subsequent game modelled on a ten-minute week proved to be a disaster to play as a 
game and this idea was abandoned (Nichols, 2010). Stable economic conditions are 
assumed to exist for the duration of the work. 
A disturbance in the form of rain delay was included in the game. The 
assumption of a set of Houston sites, with construction occurring in the May to June 
period, provides a significant probability of rain in any one week. Chouhan (2009) 
provided a drawing (Figure 5) showing the rain probability obtained from a NOAA web 
site.  
van Vleet‟s assumption was an average of 30% rainfall probability per day. A 
single day of rain typically did not delay completion of the work, but two days or a 
carryover job from the previous week impacted the bidding capacity. A job carried over 
from the previous week reduced the bid capacity by one site.  
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Figure 5 Rain Probability in Houston (after NOAA, 2009 and Chouhan, 2009) 
There will be no additional charges for any delays, nor is the contractor penalized 
for the delay in cost terms as the contractor is assumed to make reasonable arrangements 
with the workforce for rain delays, these delay costs are assumed to be covered in each 
player‟s bids. The issue with the rain delay is the likely concurrence of rain on all sites, 
which is not allowed for in this method of rain allocation. 
Table 4 presents the rain delay data for the first week of the Reverse Auction 
Bidding game. A one (1) indicates rain on a particular day at a particular site, resulting 
in a delay to the contract completion. 
 Each bidder had a nominal capacity for three jobs per week. Rain delays could 
reduce this capacity, theoretically to zero, although statistically this is improbable. 
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Table 4 
Rain Delay Data for First Week 
Day Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 
Monday 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Tuesday 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Wednesday 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Thursday 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Friday 1 0 0 0 1 1 
Saturday 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
A mechanism was provided for each bidder to increase their capacity to bid as 
shown in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6 Bank Guarantee Screen 
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This is a reverse auction process; the protocols are coded in the ASP program to 
ensure that only a lower bid value is accepted. An erroneously high bids results in Figure 
7 being displayed, which warns that entering a higher bid amount than the current lowest 
bid amount is not allowed.  
 
 
Figure 7 High Bid Screen 
A game typically lasts from three to four hours. Players become fatigued after 
about nine games.  
BIDDING TRENDS 
Chouhan (2009) postulated that four trend period could be observed in a Reverse 
Auction game. Figure 8 shows the job data from Chouhan‟s study. Job identifiers are 
unique to each case study, with Chouhan‟s study numbered approximately 490 to 560. 
This type of change in the bidding has been observed in previous games to a varying 
degree (Chaudary, 2009; Shankar, 2005; van Vleet, 2004). The observations shown in 
Figure 8 have been statistically analysed to confirm the apparent visually observed 
pattern.  
28 
 
 
Figure 8 Reverse Auction Data Job Profit Relative to Cost from Chouhan (2009) 
Figure 10 shows a trend line added to the data in Figure 8. The job identifiers are 
reset to commence at one. The trend-line shows an increase in the average job as the job 
number increases. The R
2
 coefficient at 0.459 indicates a positive pattern, although one 
with significant variation. Chouhan postulated that particular periods of play in the 
Reverse Auction Bid data indicates different stages in the development of the game play. 
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Figure 9 Reverse Auction Bid Data from Figure 8 with Trend Line Added 
y = 0.0385x - 0.0083
R² = 0.4629
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Rogers (2010) suggested a fifth order polynomial to fit the data. Figure 10 shows 
this type trend line fitted to the data. The trend line picks up the characteristics of the 
data, but it‟s smooth and continuous form limits the ability to fit rapidly changing data. 
 
 
Figure 10 Reverse Auction Bid Data from Figure 8 with Trend Line 
The theory postulated is outlined in summary form in Table 5. Similar 
observations have occurred in other case studies. Nichols (2010) suggested that the 
learning period occurs with new participants who have no prior experience in bidding 
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and bid low with the mistaken assumption that this is the best strategy for playing the 
game. At some stage, a i  player determines that some jobs are not being bid as 
competitively as others are and obtains a job at higher profit. Some or all of the other i  
players discover the ability to increase their returns, resulting in a significant average 
increase in price to the    player, followed by a brief competitive period and then a 
longer period of higher profits. This is a future research area.  
 
Table 5 
Chouhan's Postulated Trends in Bid Period 
Job Identifier Number Description of the Trend Period 
0 to 13:  Learning 
14 to 21:  Discovering 
22 to 27:  Competitive 
28 to 49: Profit Gain 
 
The theory postulated by Chouhan can be tested using the Student‟s t Test. Table 
6 lists the results for the Student‟s t test analysis and cross analysis of the four postulated 
stages.  
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Table 6 
Student's t Test Analysis of the Trend Periods 
Stage 1 2 3 4 
1 - -5.30 -3.9 -14.1 
2  - 2.42 -2.58 
3   - -6.82 
4    - 
 
Student‟s t Test is a standard test to determine if two sets of numbers (Borowski 
& Borwein, 1989; Weinberg & Schumaker, 1964) are derived from the same base data 
set. Six Student‟s t tests were completed on data shown in Figure 8. The results 
presented in Table 6 show that the trend periods are represented by number sets that are 
not derived from the same base set. At least for this data set, Chouhan‟s postulate holds 
at the 5% level of confidence. 
COMMENTS 
Reverse Auction Bidding is a relatively new system of purchasing goods and 
services. As with all new systems, it has its proponents and those who are antagonistic to 
the system because of the perceived interference that may occur in the process. The 
long-term study at TAMU in the Construction Science Department is attempting to 
investigate some of the main issues with Reverse Auction Bidding.  
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This research work is a review of the first case study on Reverse Auction 
Bidding completed by van Vleet in 2004. This chapter outlines the original study 
procedure, the data collected and the initial analysis completed by van Vleet. The basic 
methods are common to all Reverse Auction Bidding studies completed at Texas A&M 
University.  
ORIGINAL STUDY PROCEDURE – UNIQUE FEATURES 
The basics common to all Reverse Auction Bidding games was presented in the 
Literature Review. The key element distinguishing the different games is the number of 
players and the distribution of the number of jobs in each week of the game.  
The number of jobs in a week is determined using a roll of three dice, providing a 
truncated approximately normal distribution. The first case study had five players so that 
most weeks the bidders have spare capacity, which provides the competition driving 
mechanism. This study used five participants, which provides a Herfindahl index of 
2000. This number of participants is at about the limit at which the Justice Department 
considers is concentrated, although with five bidders of equal capacity it should not be 
considered non-competitive. An integer count of 3 to 18 from the die roll is not normally 
distributed because of the truncated range and the integer nature of the count. The 
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number of possible combinations with three dice are 216. A plot of the Gaussian 
distribution (Weinberg & Schumaker, 1964) against the probability for each the sixteen 
combination of numbers from 3 to 18 available from a set of three dice is shown on 
Figure 11. The differences are minor and for all intents and purpose not statistically 
significant for the purposes of this research. 
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Figure 11 Probability of the Job Data Distribution per Week 
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The weekly distribution of jobs used in this game is listed in Table 7. The critical 
issue is the limited number of weeks for the game, assuming the mean number of jobs at 
10.5 as shown in Table 7, a game would need to cover 21 weeks to cover an 
approximation of the probability distribution for three dice.   
 
Table 7 
Number of Jobs per Week and Descriptive Statistics 
Week Jobs 
1 13 
2 6 
3 11 
4 10 
5 11 
6 14 
7 11 
8 Not used (11) 
Mean 10.875 
Standard Deviation 2.54 
Total 76 
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The mean is slightly higher than the true mean of three dice and the standard 
deviation is about 76 % of the true standard deviation. The data set lacks the higher 
values covered in a full 216 weeks. The real game terminated at Week7. As this was the 
first case study, it was considered important to randomly number the sites and determine 
the site identity number. The simplest way to do was to randomly number the site from 1 
to 6. This was achieved using a single dice. Costs such as traveling and delivery related 
to the site, were assumed to be proportional to the distance of the site with respect to 
Sugar Land base of the   player. 
ORIGINAL STUDY PARTICIPANTS AND GAME PERIOD 
The auction was conducted using 5 participants. Each participant was briefed 
about the website, rules and regulations. The name of the participants are not disclosed 
due to IRB confidentiality requirements. Each participant was given an logon identity 
and password. Each was isolated from other participants to avoid communication. The 
process continued for 3 hours and then all participants came together to discuss the 
results.  
VAN VLEET DATA AND ANALYSIS 
692 bids were captured by the ASP system over the course of the experiment, for 
the 76 jobs. The data from the findings of the project was analyzed using SPSS 13.0 (van 
Vleet, 2004). Van Vleet‟s first step was to gain an overall understanding of the project, 
checking to analyze any apparent trends and looking for possible price outliers that may 
adversely affect the findings. The Contract job prices are shown in Figure 12.  
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Figure 12 Profits for the 76 Jobs 
The figure is a modified by removing two jobs (job 24 and 25 with profits of 
$18550 and $14550), which were obscuring the main features of the graph.  
A fifth order polynomial was fitted to the data, to gain some understanding of the 
relative changes in the profit with time. The polynomial shows the underlying pattern in 
the profit data, as postulated by Chouhan. 
The game theory established for this Reverse Auction Bidding included an 
equation for the form of the contracts, as shown below. 
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                                               j j
    ,       (2) 
  represents the differential upper limit the   player is prepared to pay in the 
game above the nominal minimum bid amount  . In reality, K is an array with a unique 
entry for each site. A negative   represents a loss on direct costs to the i player who 
makes this type of bid, and enough of these bids will lead to a bankrupt player.   
represents a normalization of the amount the   player has had to accept under the rules 
of the game.   allows a direct comparison of the results from different games, without 
becoming lost in the argument about how high an amount a real   player would accept 
for the bids. The assumption is the distribution of  represents a real bidding scenario. 
The data from Figure 12 has been re-cast in the form of  and is shown in Figure 13. 
 
 
Figure 13 Normalized Profit Data 
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Table 8 provides a summary of the results in histogram form. 
 
Table 8  
Normalized Profit Results 
  Range Number 
Less than 0 0 
0 to 0.1 3 
0.11 to 0.2 35 
0.21 to 0.3 13 
0.31 to 0.4 4 
0.41 to 0.5 5 
0.51 to 0.6 2 
0.61 to 0.7 7 
0.71 to 0.8 2 
0.81 to 0.9 1 
0.91 to 1.0 1 
 
Figure 14 shows a histogram of the Ξ; results shown in Table 8. 
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Figure 14 Shows a Histogram of Ξ and Its Frequency. 
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The results show a non Gaussian distribution that will be the subject of future 
studies. Figure 15 shows the percentage of the total number of jobs won by each 
participant.  
 
 
Figure 15 Jobs won by Participants as a Percentage 
COMMENTS 
The key elements of van Vleet‟s methods and research results are summarized in 
this methodology chapter. The subsequent analysis uses this data.  
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The research objectives for this study are:  
1. Establish plots of the bidding data  
2. Compare the bidding patterns shown in the plots with time for all bidders 
3. Determine if evidence exists in the bidding data to confirm the existence of the 
  game and does it represent some form of collusion 
4. Compare the returns of the different bidders in the   game to determine if there 
are differences in bidding returns and does it represent some form of collusion 
The results presented are the trend period comparison, descriptive statistics of the 
bid data, descriptive statistics of the contract data, bid period comparison, and 
differential bid data. The results presented are used to provide: 
1. Trend period comparison to determine if the van Vleet data shows 
elements of the trend periods postulated by Chouhan, to provide data  to 
answer  the second objective 
2. Descriptive statistics for the bid data to provide data for the first objective 
3. Descriptive statistics for the job cost data to provide data for the first and 
third objectives 
4. Bid period statistics to provide data on the temporal distribution of 
bidding during the game period to provide data for the third and fourth 
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objectives and establish differential bid statistics related to the last and the 
second last bid data to provide data for the third and fourth objectives 
TREND PERIOD COMPARISON 
Chouhan postulated a set of four different periods in the game as presented in 
Table 5 (page. 31). Figure 12 shows the set of job profits for van Vleet‟s study. Four 
trend periods have been established for the data shown on Figure 12.  
Table 9 presents the estimated job numbers representing the limits of the four 
trend period to match those periods postulated by Chouhan.  
 
Table 9 
Trend Periods in van Vleet Data 
Description of the Trend Period Job at Start of Period Job at End of Period 
Learning 1 20  
Discovering 21 40  
Competitive 41 51  
Profit Gain 52 76  
 
A descriptive comparison can be made between the trend periods observed in the 
two studies, refer to Table 10. The graphs looked similar but the average return for 
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Chouhan‟s study were higher than van Vleet‟s. No further comment can be added to this 
observation, other than to strongly suggest this is an area of future research. 
 
Table 10 
Comparison of the Trend Periods for the Two Studies 
Trend Description Chouhan van Vleet 
Learning Evident Highly similar 
Discovering Evident Highly similar 
Competitive Evident Similar, not proven 
Profit gain Evident Quite similar 
 
The theory postulated by Chouhan can be tested using the Student‟s t Test. Table 
11 lists the results for the Student‟s t test analysis and cross analysis of the four 
postulated stages in van Vleet‟s data.  
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Table 11 
Student's t Test Analysis of the Trend Periods of van Vleets Data 
Stage 1 2 3 4 
1 - -7.3 -0.96 -4.74 
2  - 7.02 2.98 
3   - -4.32 
 
The results are not as distinct as Chouhan‟s and the correlation evident between 
the first and third trend periods should be the subject of review using other case studies. 
The statistical observation between the first and the third stage suggests that the 
competitive period is as competitive as the learning stage in this game. 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE BID DATA 
The bid data has been summarized for each week in Table 12. 
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Table 12 
Number of Jobs and Number of Bids per Job per Week  
Week Jobs/week Bids/week 
1 13 130 
2 6 100 
3 11 63 
4 10 74 
5 11 117 
6 14 109 
7 11 99 
Total 76 692 
 
The results show a tolerably constant rate of bidding for the game period. Table 
13 lists the number of bids made and the number of jobs won in the game by each of the 
bidders.  
 
 
47 
 
Table 13 
Different Factors for the Bidders  
Rank Participant No. of Bids Jobs Won 
1 5 218 17 
2 3 92 22 
3 4 167 13 
4 1 147 16 
5 2 70 8 
 
Profit data is presented in Table 14. The ratio between the highest profit and the 
lowest profit is 3.7.  
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Table 14 
Profit Data 
Rank Participant Loan ($) Profit ($) 
1 5 11,000 91,673 
2 3 8,500 59,170 
3 4 2,000 53,025 
4 1 4,000 37,559 
5 2 2,500 24,650 
 
The data in the tables is sorted in order of highest to lowest profit return for the 
five participants. Participant number 5 had the highest profit, whilst making the greatest 
number of bids. Participant number 5 won jobs at a higher overall profit rate when 
compared to the next highest return by participant number 3. 
These results point to a future research area. The trend-line on the figure has been 
assumed to not pass through the origin. A R
2
 of 0.7 for this type of data is statistically 
significant. 
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Figure 16 Loan Plotted Against Profit Data 
Table 15 presents the bid efficiency data. Nichols (2010) considered that bid 
efficiency should be an indicator of success. The results do not support that view. There 
is no observed relationship in the data.  
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Table 15 
Bid Efficiency 
Rank Participant No. of Bids Jobs Won Bid efficiency (%) 
1 5 218 17 8.7 
2 3 92 22 23.91 
3 4 167 13 8.8 
4 1 147 16 10.88 
5 2 70 8 13.88 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE WON JOB DATA 
Table 16 lists the profit efficiency for each bidder. The only obvious correlation 
in this data is the link between the greatest profit and the highest profit efficiency. This 
subject is worth additional study, although no real conclusion can be drawn from this 
limited data set. 
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Table 16 
Profit Efficiency 
Rank Participant Profit Efficiency ($) 
1 5 5,392.50 
2 3 2,689.50 
3 4 4,078.00 
4 1 2,347.00 
5 2 3,081.25 
 
Figure 17 shows the percentage of jobs won in descending rank order. No 
conclusions can be reached from this data. 
 
 
Figure 17 Overall Percentage Wins by All the Participants 
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The profit percentage of each of the participants has been plotted in the following 
figures, Figure 18 to Figure 22. The results show a broad scatter that suggests a more 
random process in winning jobs than the descriptive data listed above would suggest.  
 
 
Figure 18 Participant One Histogram of Profit Percentage for Jobs 
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Figure 19 Participant Two Histogram of Profit Percentage for Jobs 
 
Figure 20 Participant Three Histogram of Profit Percentage for Jobs 
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Figure 21 Participant Four Histogram of Profit Percentage for Jobs 
 
 
Figure 22 Participant Five Histogram of Profit Percentage for Jobs 
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Even participant five showed a significant variation in profit percentages. 
 
Figure 23 Histogram of Profit Percentages of Participant Five  
The results show one extremely high percent profit, which may simply be a 
fortuitous event. But, Nichols (2010) suggested that the evidence points to high profits 
being achieved occasionally but randomly.  
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Figure 24 Histogram of all Participant Profit Percentages. 
BID PERIOD COMPARISON 
The bidding pattern with time for each participant is listed in Table 17 to Table 
21. The results show the trend towards late bidding by some participants. 
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Table 17 
Bids Made in 15-Minute Time Intervals - Participant 1 
 
Bid Periods 
 
Time 
(mins) 
7:00-
7:15 
7:20-
7:35 
7:40-
7:55 
8:00-
8:15 
8:20-
8:35 
8:40-
8:55 
9:00-
9:15 
total 
bids 
1 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 4 
2 3 2 1 1 1 3 0 11 
3 2 2 1 0 0 1 2 8 
4 2 0 0 0 0 1 3 6 
5 2 0 0 1 0 3 4 10 
6 2 1 0 0 0 3 0 6 
7 0 1 1 0 3 0 0 5 
8 2 1 1 0 3 1 0 8 
9 2 0 1 3 2 0 0 8 
10 3 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 
11 4 0 2 1 3 0 0 10 
12 5 0 2 0 0 5 0 12 
13 3 0 2 1 1 2 0 9 
14 2 2 2 1 3 1 3 14 
15 3 5 3 5 1 8 3 28 
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Table 18 
Bids Made in 15-Minute Time Intervals - Participant 2 
 
Bids Periods 
 
Time 
(mins) 
7:00-
7:15 
7:20-
7:35 
7:40-
7:55 
8:00-
8:15 
8:20-
8:35 
8:40-
8:55 
9:00-
9:15 
total 
bids 
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 4 
2 2 1 0 1 2 3 2 11 
3 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 
4 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 3 
5 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 3 
6 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 
7 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
8 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 
9 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
10 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 3 
11 0 0 1 0 2 0 2 5 
12 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 3 
13 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 3 
14 1 1 0 0 1 2 1 6 
15 3 3 1 1 3 3 6 20 
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Table 19 
Bids Made in 15-Minute Time Intervals - Participant 3 
 
Bid Periods 
 
Time 
(mins) 
7:00-
7:15 
7:20-
7:35 
7:40-
7:55 
8:00-
8:15 
8:20-
8:35 
8:40-
8:55 
9:00-
9:15 
total 
bids 
1 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 3 
2 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 
3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
4 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 5 
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 4 
8 2 2 0 0 1 1 0 6 
9 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 5 
10 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 6 
11 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
12 5 1 0 1 0 1 0 8 
13 3 1 0 0 2 1 0 7 
14 4 1 1 1 4 0 1 12 
15 5 3 3 4 6 2 4 27 
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Table 20 
Bids Made in 15-Minute Time Intervals - Participant 4 
 
Bid Periods 
 
Time 
(mins) 
7:00-
7:15 
7:20-
7:35 
7:40-
7:55 
8:00-
8:15 
8:20-
8:35 
8:40-
8:55 
9:00-
9:15 
total 
bids 
1 2 0 3 0 1 2 1 9 
2 2 1 0 1 0 0 3 7 
3 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 4 
4 2 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 
5 1 2 1 0 0 2 5 11 
6 2 1 0 0 0 2 1 6 
7 1 1 0 0 2 2 2 8 
8 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 5 
9 3 4 2 0 2 1 1 13 
10 2 0 0 2 2 2 0 8 
11 2 4 0 2 4 0 0 12 
12 1 3 1 2 1 2 0 10 
13 2 3 2 3 1 4 2 17 
14 2 3 2 2 4 5 5 23 
15 4 5 2 4 3 5 7 30 
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Table 21 
Bids Made in 15-Minute Time Intervals - Participant 5 
 
Bid Periods 
 
Time 
(mins) 
7:00-
7:15 
7:20-
7:35 
7:40-
7:55 
8:00-
8:15 
8:20-
8:35 
8:40-
8:55 
9:00-
9:15 
total 
bids 
1 2 0 3 0 3 0 0 8 
2 1 0 2 0 1 4 1 9 
3 1 0 1 0 1 0 2 5 
4 1 1 0 2 0 1 1 6 
5 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 4 
6 1 0 0 0 1 2 3 7 
7 2 2 1 1 5 1 2 14 
8 2 1 0 2 6 0 2 13 
9 0 3 0 0 3 5 1 12 
10 2 1 1 3 4 0 1 12 
11 1 6 1 3 4 0 1 16 
12 2 3 2 3 3 4 1 18 
13 2 4 3 4 4 6 2 25 
14 3 5 4 5 4 5 5 31 
15 2 5 4 5 6 7 6 35 
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Figure 25 shows the bid period data for Participant 1. This participant bids at a 
tolerably constant rate, showing the usual flurry of bids in the last two minutes. This 
bidder ranked fourth in profit. 
 
 
Figure 25 Participant 1: Bid Distribution per Minute  
Figure 26 shows the bid period data for Participant 2. This participant bids at a 
tolerably constant, but low rate, showing the usual flurry of bids in the last two minutes. 
This bidder ranked fifth in profit. The bidder is a poor performer.  
Figure 27 shows the bid period data for Participant 3. This participant bids at a 
usually low rate, showing the usual flurry of bids in the last two minutes. This bidder 
ranked second in profit. The bidder is a selective performer.  
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Figure 26 Participant 2: Bid Distribution per Minute  
 
 
Figure 27 Participant 3: Bid Distribution per Minute  
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Bid period 1
Bid period 2
Bid period 3
Bid period 4
Bid period 5
Bid period 6
Bid period 7
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Bid period1
Bid period2
Bid period3
Bid period4
Bid period5
Bid period6
Bid period7
64 
 
Figure 28 shows the bid period data for Participant 4. This participant bids at a 
constant low rate, showing the usual flurry of bids in the last two minutes. This bidder 
ranked third in profit. The bidder is best described as a non-selective performer.  
 
 
Figure 28 Participant 4: Bid Distribution per Minute  
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Figure 29 shows the bid period data for Participant 5.  
 
 
Figure 29 Participant 5: Bid Distribution per Minute  
This participant bids at a slowly increasing rate, showing the usual flurry of bids 
in the last five minutes. This bidder ranked first in profit. The bidder is best described as 
a highly selective performer. 
From the above histograms, it is evident that participant 3, with the greatest 
number of jobs, adopted the strategy of bidding late. This participant did most bidding in 
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the last 3 minutes and won more jobs when compared to participant 5, with the 
maximum profit and bid number, who bid aggressively right from the start.  
The Table 22 below shows the total number of bids in each minute for all 
bidders. 
 
Table 22  
Bids Made in 15-Minute Time Intervals - All Participants 
  Bid Periods   
Time 
(mins) 
7:00-
7:15 
7:20-
7:35 
7:40-
7:55 
8:00-
8:15 
8:20-
8:35 
8:40-
8:55 
9:00-
9:15 
total 
bids 
1 4 1 7 4 7 2 3 28 
2 12 4 4 3 4 10 6 43 
3 6 4 2 1 2 1 5 21 
4 7 2 1 2 1 4 8 25 
5 3 3 1 2 1 5 14 29 
6 5 3 0 0 1 7 5 21 
7 5 5 2 2 10 5 4 33 
8 6 6 1 2 12 3 4 34 
9 9 9 3 3 8 6 3 41 
10 11 3 3 7 7 2 1 34 
11 9 10 4 6 13 0 3 45 
12 13 7 5 6 6 12 2 51 
13 10 10 7 8 9 13 4 61 
14 12 12 9 9 16 13 15 86 
15 17 21 13 19 19 25 26 140 
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Figure 30 shows that the participants bid at a slowly increasing rate, with the 
usual flurry of bids in the last five minutes. This pattern is observed in nearly all the 
participants‟ individual histograms. 
 
 
Figure 30 All Participants: Bid Distribution per Minute 
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Rogers (2010) suggested a stock chart plot for the aggregated data. Table 23 
shows the highest, lowest and the average bids of each minute of the game. 
  
Table 23 
Highest, Lowest and Average Number of Bids in Each Minute 
Minutes 
- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
high 9 11 8 6 11 7 14 13 13 12 16 18 25 31 35 
low 3 5 1 3 1 0 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 6 20 
Average 4.8 7.5 4 5 5.6 4.5 6.6 7 8.2 7.3 9.3 10.5 12.3 16.6 25.8 
 
Figure 31 shows a stock plot, which gives the highest, lowest and the average 
number of bids that were made during each minute (all 15 bidding periods).  
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Figure 31 Figure Showing Highest, Lowest, and Average Number of Bids in Each 
Minute. 
 
 
The curve made by average bids is an approximate smooth curve, but the lowest 
and the highest bid points are not as apparently smooth as the average curve. Figure 32 
shows a plot of the count of the average bids per minute for the 15 minutes game.  
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Figure 32 Histogram showing Average bids per Minute to the Jobs Won 
A significant amount of time has been spent analyzing the data to review the 
results from the alternatives. The first step is to analyze and to plot the bid distribution 
y = -6E-05x6 + 0.0037x5 - 0.0834x4 + 0.868x3 - 4.2554x2 + 8.8663x - 0.2605
R² = 0.9826
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
C
o
u
n
t 
o
f 
B
id
s 
p
e
r 
M
in
u
te
Minutes
71 
 
for all participants per minute, as shown in Figure 30, followed by a determination of the 
average results per bid minute as shown in Figure 31.  
Figure 30 showed that a pattern existed in the bidding data, with an average 
increase with bids per minute across the game time. Figure 32 shows a simple statistical 
analysis, where a sixth order polynomial is fitted to the data. The result has a regression 
co-efficient of 0.98; whilst the fit is good, the cyclic movement of the data about the 
fitted line is evident. The accepted analysis technique for this type of data is to determine 
the difference between the trend line and the data points to create a residuals data set, 
followed by a Fast Fourier transform analysis of the residuals (Kordzakhia, 1998). 
An alternative to the approach above was to take the logarithms of the count data, 
to reduce the residuals from the higher minutes, when compared to the earlier minutes. 
Figure 33 shows the logarithm of the graph of bids per minute, with a second order 
equation fitted to the data. 
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Figure 33 Logarithm of Bids per Minute 
The residuals show a cyclic trend that can be analyzed using the Fast Fourier 
transforms. There are 15 data points that can be mapped to a 16 array for a Fast Fourier 
transform analysis (Brigham, 1988). Figure 34 shows the Fast Fourier transform plotted 
against period in place of the usual frequency x axis plot.  
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Figure 34 Fast Fourier Transform Results Plotted Against Period 
The results in this figure show two sinusoidal patterns in the data, one with a 
period of about 3 minutes and the other with a period of approximately 7.5 minutes. The 
results show a sinusoidal pattern in the bidding with a cycle of three minutes, which 
suggests the bidders are following a pattern, which suggests further research. Whilst the 
second pattern has a period of about 8 minutes represents the rate of change in bidding to 
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some extent. It is not unusual for statistical data relate to human to show this type of 
pattern.  Figure 35 shows a plot histogram of total number of bids made participant 2 per 
minute. A third order polynomial has been fitted to the point data.  
 
 
Figure 35 Participant 1: Total Bid Distribution per Minute  
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Participant 1 bids at a tolerably constant rate until minute 14 and then doubles the 
rate of bidding. Participant 1 had the second lowest profit.  
Figure 36 shows a plot histogram of total number of bids made Participant 2 per 
minute. A third order polynomial has been fitted to the point data.  
 
 
Figure 36 Participant 2: Total Bid Distribution per Minute  
y = 0.0256x3 - 0.4228x2 + 1.3263x + 4.6095
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Participant 2 bids aggressively in the last minute, but bid at a low rate for the 
bulk of the duration of the game. An aggressive increase in the second minute and the 
final minute. 
Figure 37 shows a plot histogram of total number of bids made participant 3 per 
minute. A third order polynomial has been fitted to the point data. 
  
 
Figure 37 Participant 3: Total Bid Distribution per Minute  
y = 0.0316x3 - 0.5568x2 + 2.7412x - 0.1121
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Participant 3 bids aggressively in the last minute, but as the second highest profit 
taker, the pattern for Participant 3 is highly variable.  
Figure 38 shows a plot histogram of total number of bids made participant 4 per 
minute. A third order polynomial has been fitted to the point data.  
 
 
Figure 38 Participant 4: Total Bid Distribution per Minute  
Participant 4 bids aggressively throughout the game when compared to the 
others, but performed in the middle of the pack in terms of profit. 
Figure 39 shows a plot histogram of total number of bids made participant 5 per 
minute. A third order polynomial has been fitted to the point data.  
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Figure 39 Participant 5: Total Bid Distribution per Minute  
y = 0.0089x3 + 0.017x2 - 0.4424x + 7.9377
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Participant 5 bids aggressively from the seventh minute and has the maximum 
profit for the game. Table 24 shows the coefficients for the third order fitted equation for 
the five participants.  
 
Table 24 
Third Order Equation Coefficients 
Participant 
Profit 
ranking 
Constant X X2 X3 Comment 
1 4 2.1788 3.947 0.732 0.0379 Constant 
2 5 4.6095 1.3263 0.4228 0.0256 
Low rate, 
aggressive 
at minute 
2 and 15 
3 2 0.1121 2.7412 0.5568 0.0316 Variable 
4 3 6.5143 0.9114 0.2739 0.0208 Aggressive 
5 1 7.9377 0.4424 0.017 0.0089 
Aggressive 
late 
 
This table provides data for establishing an algorithm for an electronic bidder. 
There are no visible trends in plots of the coefficients against the profit ranking, from 
plotting all of the coefficients against the profit ranking. 
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DIFFERENTIAL BID DATA 
One of the critical numbers of interest in analysis for bidding in any system is the 
difference between the winning bid and the second last bid on each job. Table 25 to 
Table 29 present the difference in the second to winning bid in dollar terms for the five 
participants. There is a significant amount of information in the bid count data. This is an 
area of future research.  
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Table 25 
Difference between the Winning Bid and the Second Last Bid on Each Job that 
Participant 1 Won 
Job ID Difference between the winning bid and the 
second last bid 
2 99 
8 1 
14 200 
15 50 
29 500 
35 1999 
41 1000 
46 1999 
47 900 
56 500 
57 500 
62 11000 
63 12000 
75 1000 
77 145 
78 145 
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Table 26 
Difference between the Winning Bid and the Second Last Bid on Each Job that 
Participant 2 Won 
 
Job ID 
 
Difference between the winning bid and the second last bid 
13 100 
17 200 
19 68100 
27   14300 
31 76775 
36 3000 
49 1000 
69 750 
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Table 27 
Difference between the Winning Bid and the Second Last Bid on Each Job that 
Participant 3 Won 
Job ID Difference between the winning bid and the 
second last bid 
3 1 
6 1 
9 1 
18 - 
20 67350 
22 188000 
26 4000 
30 5000 
33 3000 
34 4000 
42 3000 
51 100 
52 500 
53 1 
54 3500 
58 7500 
59 2500 
66 1000 
67 2500 
71 6500 
72 7099 
 
84 
 
Table 28 
Difference between the Winning Bid and the Second Last Bid on Each Job that 
Participant 4 Won 
 
Job ID Difference between winning bid and the second last bid 
5 250 
10 299 
12 25 
16 300 
28 15000 
32 14000 
39 2000 
40 2000 
48 500 
50 500 
64 1999 
65 5500 
70 5000 
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Table 29 
Difference between the Winning Bid and the Second Last Bid on each Job that 
Participant 5 Won 
 
Job ID Difference between the winning bid and the second last bid 
1 149 
4 999 
7 150 
11 650 
21 1000 
23 1000 
37 2000 
38 1000 
43 500 
44 500 
45 800 
55 500 
60 1000 
61 5000 
68 100 
74 1 
76 1 
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Table 30 lists the participants in profit ranking order and summarizes the lost 
money for each participant in terms of mean and standard deviation.  
 
Table 30 
Money Lost Descriptive Statistics 
Profit Ranking Participant 
Average of Lost 
Money 
$ 
Standard Deviation 
of Lost Money 
$ 
1 5 903 1,172 
2 3 15,277 43,201 
3 4 3,644 5,134 
4 1 2,002 3,764 
5 2 20,528 32,460 
 
Clearly, participant 5 is a more disciplined bidder than the rest of the bidders. 
The data does not follow a Gaussian distribution. Table 30 shows the money lost by the 
bidders while making the final bid on the job won. The results show a great variation in 
number but it can be clearly seen that the average money lost by participant 5 is much 
lower when compared to other participants. Participant 5 did not win the maximum 
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number of jobs, but yet this participant obtained the  maximum profit out of all 5 
participants. 
Figure 40 shows a graph of average number of bids to the jobs won by the 
bidders. There appears to be a weak but somewhat direct relationship in this data that 
can be used in an analysis. The data provides bounds for establishing the behavior of an 
electronic bidder that may be used in future games. 
 
 
Figure 40 Histogram of Average Number of Bids to Jobs Won  
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Figure 41 shows a graph of average number of bids to the profit made by the 
bidders. There appears to be a weak but somewhat direct relationship in this data that 
can be used in an analysis. The data provides bounds for establishing the behavior of an 
electronic bidder that may be used in future games. 
 
 
 
Figure 41 Histogram of Average Number of Bids to Amount of Profit Made by 
Each Participant  
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CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS 
 
The research objectives for this study are:  
1. Establish plots of the bidding data,  
2. Compare the bidding patterns shown in the plots with time for all bidders, 
3. Determine if evidence exists in the bidding data to confirm the existence of the 
  game and does it represent some form of collusion, and 
4. Compare the returns of the different bidders in the   game to determine if there 
are differences in bidding returns and does it represent some form of collusion. 
As noted in the literature review, this type of study can become data rich but 
analysis poor, because of the quantity of the data and the limited ability to determine 
patterns and trends in such a large quantity of data. Significant advances have been made 
in the field of data mining (Chakrabarti, 2009), but the data collected by van Vleet is not 
amenable to these techniques.  
This chapter presents a summary of the bidding data, bidding patterns, and 
comments on the game   and game   to provide the results that address the objectives. 
BIDDING DATA 
Objective One was to establish plots for the bidding data. The job distribution per 
week is based on a roll of three dice, which because of the truncated integer nature of the 
216 possible combinations results in a slightly non-Gaussian distribution as shown in 
Figure 11 (pg. 34). This study lasted for seven game weeks and covered 76 jobs, for 
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which 692 bids were made by the five participants. Table 7 presents the descriptive 
statistics for the number of jobs per week. The mean of 10.875 is slightly higher than the 
distribution mean and the standard deviation of the job data per week is 76% of the 
standard deviation for the dice distribution.  
Figure 12 shows the profits for the 76 jobs. The profit data was normalized using 
equation (1). A histogram summary of the normalized profit levels is presented in Table 
8. This histogram is the key to understand the driving economic mechanism for game α. 
This game is created by the purchaser in deciding to use the RAB system and represents 
the basis for the tacit collusion observation by van Vleet (2004). The tacit collusion is 
observation of the cannier participants obtaining a higher return relative to the average 
returns. 
BIDDING PATTERNS 
Chouhan (2009) postulated that four trend periods were observable in the job 
price data with contract number. A Student‟s t Test analysis showed that Chouhan‟s data 
could be described in these terms. A similar analysis of van Vleet‟s data, shown in Table 
11, supports the concept of trends in data, but the results are not as conclusive as 
Chouhan‟s. This is an area for future research. 
A number of results from this analysis deserve additional research. The first 
result is the observation of a positive correlation between the bank loans used the profit 
returned as shown in Figure 16 (pg. 49).  
The maximum profit returned was to Participant 5 who earned 91,673 or about 
3.7 times as much as Participant 2 who was lowest with 24,650. Participant 5 had the 
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lowest total for the amount between this participant‟s bid and the bid being replaced in 
the game. This is a critical point for maintaining higher profit levels. The histogram of 
the profit percentages shown in Figure 24 shows a reasonable distribution form, although 
data from other studies will be required to confirm the pattern. This pattern however 
provides one of the driving mechanisms for the α game. There are differences in the 
returns of bidders, which is the first observation of the interaction between the ω game 
and the α game.  
GAME   
There is significant construction community resistance to using Reverse Auction 
Bidding in the construction industry. The purchaser or   player is clearly trying with 
this method to minimize the average costs of the components or goods purchased from 
the   player. The   player collectively has to accept the bids if they are made within 
the rules, and so in game terms the average cost of the jobs is the measure of success of 
the Reverse Auction Bidding system used by the   player.  
The   player creates the game and has to accept the economic consequences of 
this decision. van Vleet (2004) used the term tacit collusion to describe the behaviour of 
the   player, who did not offer a uniform job price structure. This is the behaviour 
causing concern for the industry participants. Nichols (2010) postulated the presence of 
the α game within the overall Reverse Auction Bidding game.  
The game ω is in essence a one to one game between the set of players ( i  
player) and the purchaser, but the  game is a multiplayer game and hence less 
amenable to exact modelling. 
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  player is trying to exert economic pressure on the   player, with the clear 
goal of reducing the average cost of jobs. There is no evidence in van Vleet‟s data that 
the   player succeeds in implementing this strategy and a brief review of the  game 
suggests the converse may be true in some situations, specifically considering the 
significant returns obtained by participant 5. 
GAME   
i  players are attempting to maximize their returns from the game. The results 
show that some players in this game can attain higher returns than the competitors. This 
observation has driven the Reverse Auction Bidding research at TAMU since van 
Vleet‟s study, as attempts are made to research this game and understand the driving 
mechanisms. 
The game is created by the   player, which has been amended in subsequent 
case studies to introduce some constraints on bidding limits (Chouhan, 2009). Analysis 
of van Vleet‟s case study data suggests that four factors influence the   game and hence 
the distribution of returns to the i  players. These factors are: 
1. A i  player makes a bid offer, and two things can occur: 
a. The bid will remain for the duration of the game and be accepted 
b. The bid will be undercut 
2. The subsequent bids by different i  players can be: 
a. offered at the limit of the game money, which in this case is 
technically one dollar.  
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b. offered at an amount higher than the limit of the game money, so 
that for example on job 63 the differential was $12,000 
3. The player i  offers a bid less than the amount of the job to that 
participant.  
4. Time runs out in some form of control on the duration of the game 
In terms of Factor 1a, this strategy offers the  player the greatest return in the   game 
and the greatest cost to the   player. This form of game play has been discussed 
anecdotally when Nichols (2010) has talked to bidders involved in real Reverse Auction 
Bidding systems. The strategy for maximizing the return in terms of this play is to offer 
the highest amount the   player will tolerate without ending the game; the   player is 
clearly the loser in this strategy. 
In terms of Factor 1b, this strategy now becomes for a two-player game between 
the first bidder on the job and the second bidder. The best strategy for the second bidder 
is to offer the minimum reduction that will be accepted by the   player, which in this 
game is one dollar. Table 30 illustrates how poorly this group of bidders grasped this 
economic fact. The data shown in Table 30 shows that fact 2b is used more than 2a, even 
though 2a is in the best economic interest of the bidders. It is suggested that this is a 
result of naive bidders. In terms of factor 3, a disciplined player in a steady state 
economic condition should not make this mistake. The game controls for this to some 
extent. 
However, as Chouhan postulated the  player learns with time how to increase 
the returns whilst remaining within the game rules. This observation is evident on Figure 
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12. One then conclude that Reverse Auction Bidding is not bid shopping and the   
player has many opportunities to make returns in excess of the minimum bid offered in 
the game. There is insufficient data to determine the controlling factors in the   game 
observed by van Vleet, but the initial observation of co-operation between the players 
can not be ignored in understanding Reverse Auction Bidding. The only comment 
offered is the   player created the rules and must live with the economic consequences.  
In terms of the research objectives; 
1. Plots of the bidding data shows a pattern that has been observed in subsequent 
games. 
2. A comparison has been made, the interest results are the increase in average total 
number of bids with time. 
3. Clearly the ω game exists, otherwise the profit data would be a constant amount 
per bid at the lowest amount allowed by the rules. There is clearly a floor at 
about ten percent profit, but participants will take a higher profit when presented 
with the the opportunity, either because of fortuitous Factor 1a, event or in 
normal play with results in terms of factor 1b. 
4. Participant 5 shows the greater returns. The game strategy for good players is a 
subject for future research. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
van Vleet (2004) commenced the long running study into Reverse Auction 
Bidding at TAMU. van Vleet developed an ASP and Microsoft Access based web 
system for accepting bids for a simple residential slab project in Houston. The purpose 
of this study was to review van Vleet‟s results in light of some of the subsequent case 
studies. The review has identified a two game system that offers some guidance as to the 
game play. For the RAB game, van Vleet created a game scenario. The projects were 
house slabs for a production homebuilder at six sites. Each bidder was started with a 
capacity for three jobs per week. The number of participants in this study was five, 
giving a nominal total capacity of fifteen jobs per week, although with the use of a bank 
guarantee the bidder could increase their job capacity. The case study covered a game 
period of seven weeks, with 612 bids and 76 jobs. The complete set of statistics on the 
jobs and bids is summarized in the Methodology and Results Chapters. The critical 
elements appear to be the two games played within the Reverse Auction Bidding game.  
The first game has been designated the  game, in reality a two player game 
between the purchaser and the set of bidders. The purchaser wins in this game by 
reducing the average cost of the jobs. The bidders win by increasing the average cost of 
the jobs. This game is an open transparent economic game, where the purchaser, 
designated the   player, provides full economic disclosure on the bids during the game. 
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In stable economic conditions, this game creates the opportunity for higher returns to 
canny bidders. 
The second game has been designated the  game, which is a multiplayer game 
between the bidders. The set of bidders are attempting to maximize their return in this 
game by gaining an economic advantage over the other bidders. This is normal 
economics of everyday business. However, the game play strategy, which is identified as 
being effectively controlled by three factors, provides an opportunity for increased 
returns for a canny player. It is assumed that the players are disciplined and will not 
under bid the job. 
These factors are: 
1. A i  player makes a bid offer, and two things can occur: 
a. The bid will remain for the duration of the game and be accepted 
b. The bid will be undercut 
2. The subsequent bids by different i  players can be: 
a. offered at the limit of the game money, which in this case is 
technically one dollar.  
b. offered at an amount higher than the limit of the game money, so 
that on job 63 the differential was $12,000 
3. time runs out in some form of control on the duration of the game 
In conclusion, Reverse Auction Bidding systems are not bid shopping, but the tenet that 
the purchaser will reduce costs in this type of system compared to the traditional closed 
bid system is not confirmed with van Vleet‟s data and any careful consideration of the 
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results of canny players in the  game suggests higher than average returns are made by 
some bidders. The critical observation is the number of bids that are covered by Factor 
1a, which matches the anecdotal evidence of real Reverse Auction Bidding systems. 
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